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An Exception to the Derivative Rule
ALLOWING MUTUAL FUND INVESTORS TO BRING
SUITS DIRECTLY
INTRODUCTION
In April of 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
decided the controversial case Northstar Financial Advisors Inc.
v. Schwab Investments.1 The court found that shareholders of a
mutual fund could bring a direct instead of derivative action
against the fund’s external investment advisor for breach of
fiduciary duty.2 This holding allowed the plaintiffs to avoid the
almost insurmountable demand requirement for derivative
actions, which requires the plaintiffs to convince the board of
directors of the fund to bring the action on behalf of the fund
itself. In evaluating the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court,
using sweeping language, stated that the direct versus derivative
suit distinction is not as relevant in the mutual fund context as
with a traditional corporation.3 Generally, a board of directors
acts as representatives of the shareholders; the independent
directors—usually defined as having no other relationship to the
company aside from the directorship—are used in situations
involving conflict of interest, including considering a demand
request in derivative suits against management.4 In Northstar,
the court questioned the true independence of mutual fund board
members who were labeled as independent.5
Since this decision, many private law firms that work
with mutual funds have stated that this decision deviates from
long-standing precedent and creates confusion and uncertainty
in the mutual fund marketplace.6 The Investment Company
1 Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015).
2 Id. at 1056–62 (“[T]he distinction between direct and derivative actions has
little meaning in the context of mutual funds . . . .”).
3 Id. at 1058–60.
4 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1979).
5 Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1060–63.
6 See Seth M. Schwartz & Jason C. Vigna, The New Mutual Fund Exception:
Ninth Circuit Allows Direct Claims to Redress Derivative Injury, SKADDEN, ARPS,
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP & AFFILIATES (June 23, 2015), http://www.skadden.com/
sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Mutual_Fund_Exception_Ninth_Circuit_Allows_
Direct_Claims_to_Redress_Derivative_Injury.pdf (“This finding is likely to sow additional
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Institute (ICI)—the national association of investment
companies—filed an amici curiae brief in support of petition for
rehearing of the case en banc. The ICI argued that the Ninth
Circuit’s decision “creates new legal relationships and duties
between shareholders and boards” and “will discourage qualified
individuals from serving on fund boards.”7 Prior to this case, the
Supreme Court had categorized independent directors as
“watchdogs,” tasked with “looking after the interests of the
funds’ shareholders.”8 The Northstar decision questions whether
independent directors of mutual funds are able to perform this
“watchdog” role when the shareholders have been wronged and
seek to bring an action against the managers of the funds. While
Northstar introduced a new way to think about the relationship
between shareholders and directors in the mutual fund setting,
the precedential impact of the decision is fairly limited on its own.
One reason the impact is limited is because of the jurisdictional
scope of the decision. In the earlier case of Burks v. Lasker, the
Supreme Court held that state corporations law governed in a
claim alleging violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940, a
federal statute governing mutual funds.9 The Court noted that
federal regulation of investment companies is not meant to be all
encompassing and that because mutual funds are created
pursuant to state law, state corporations law should govern.10
Northstar was decided in the Ninth Circuit, which applied
confusion and inconsistent application of the proper analysis in future investment
company litigation.”); Jeffrey B. Maletta et al., Ninth Circuit Opinion May Open Litigation
Doors Most Thought Closed, K&L GATES (Mar. 2015), http://www.klgates.com/files/
Publication/776485e6-edc4-4948-8556-b8e5ed8f4f79/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/
dd3fed69-9a3d-4ae4-95f5-e453ada94370/IM_Alert_03192015.pdf [https://perma.cc/D4K7-
6T22] (“The Northstar opinion is in many respects at odds with other cases as well as the
general principles, developed over and supported by years of consistent practice, providing
the legal framework for the operation and governance of mutual funds.”); William F.
Sullivan et al., Regulatory Update: Recent Judicial Decisions Bring Changes to Financial
Services Industry, PAUL HASTINGS (June 2015), http://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-
source/PDFs/client-alert—-perez-northstar.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8T5-MB2P] (“[I]n many
ways, the decision raises more questions than it answers.”); see also Burks, 441 U.S. at 485
(holding that the Investment Company Act does not forbid termination of suits by
independent directors); Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2004); In re
Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 249 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
7 Brief of Amici Curiae Investment Co. Institute & Independent Directors
Council in Support of Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing en banc at 3–4, Northstar Fin.
Advisors v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2015) (No. 11-17187) [hereinafter
Brief of Amici Curiae Investment Co. Institute & Independent Directors Council].
8 Burks, 441 U.S. at 485.
9 Id. at 477–80; see also Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90 (1991)
(“The presumption that state law should be incorporated into federal common law is
particularly strong in areas in which private parties have entered legal relationships with
the expectation that their rights and obligations would be governed by state-law
standards. Corporation law is one such area.” (internal citations omitted)).
10 Burks, 441 U.S. at 478.
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Massachusetts state law;11 therefore, its holding is nonbinding on
Massachusetts or any other state.12 Because a majority of mutual
funds are set up under Massachusetts, Delaware, or Maryland
law,13 this federal case’s precedential value is likely to be limited.
If these states wish to curtail the requirement for derivative
action in the mutual fund investor context, they will need to adopt
new laws outlining the situations in which a normally derivative
suit can be brought directly, taking into account the policy reason
behind the derivative action requirement.
The application of the mutual fund exception in derivative
actions addressed by Northstar also has limited precedential
value because the portions of the decision addressing the direct
versus derivative distinction as applied to mutual funds is merely
dicta. The case turned on the court’s holding that there was a
binding contract created between the shareholders and the
trustees of the fund when the shareholders voted to adopt the
fund’s fundamental investment policies.14 These policies are set
forth in the fund’s prospectus, a document that the fund’s sponsor
must give to investors after they purchase shares but is often
given prior.15 Because the defendant breached this contract, the
court was able to fit the plaintiff’s claim into an existing
Massachusetts law that allowed shareholder plaintiffs to bring
direct action when the wrong against them involves their
contractual rights.16 This way of allowing direct action to mutual
fund shareholders is a dangerous proposition, however, because
the contents of a fund’s prospectus are largely not at the
discretion of the fund’s sponsor and are instead mandated by
federal law.17 Further, because a mutual fund is perpetually
offering shares, it must update its prospectus continually, and, if
11 Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1048.
12 Although there will certainly be an influx of mutual fund shareholder
plaintiffs who bring claims directly in the Ninth Circuit.
13 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 225 & fig.A.1 (54th ed. 2014),
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2014_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7SV-BG7T].
14 Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1054.
15 Mutual Fund Prospectus, SEC (July 28, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/answers/
mfprospectustips.htm [https://perma.cc/C6JR-LS3V].
16 Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1057 (citing Lapidus v. Hecht, 232 F.3d 679 (2000))
(“To bring a direct action under Massachusetts law, a plaintiff must allege an injury
distinct from that suffered by shareholders generally or a wrong involving one of his or
her contractual rights, such as the right to vote.”).
17 Brief of Amici Curiae Investment Co. Institute & Independent Directors,
supra note 7, at 12. Specifically, Form N-1A is a fifty-page form that “sets forth strict,
detailed, and lengthy requirements for the organization and content of a mutual fund
prospectus and all other parts of the fund’s registration statement.” Id. at 9–10; see Form
N-1A, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formn-1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/G95A-VXEG].
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courts follow the Northstar holding, could be liable for a stale
prospectus from previous offerings.18
By forcing this breach of prospectus into contract law to
avoid the derivative lawsuit requirement, the Ninth Circuit’s
decision raises the issue of whether mutual funds should be
treated as typical public corporations when shareholders bring
suit against the fund’s advisor or board members. States—
specifically Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland19—will
have to decide whether they want to address this issue by
expressly denouncing this type of application of their state laws
and continuing to force shareholders of mutual funds to bring
most claims derivatively. Instead of maintaining this status quo,
states should reevaluate the need for derivative suits in the
mutual fund space by explicitly allowing direct shareholder suits
in more situations.
This note explores whether state courts should adopt
rules that allow shareholders of mutual funds to assert claims
against the fund’s investment advisor directly and circumvent
the procedural hurdles of derivative lawsuits. Part I of this
note provides an overview of some of the unique characteristics
mutual funds have when compared to more traditional public
corporations—in particular a mutual fund’s highly interested
“disinterested” board members, the investor makeup of mutual
funds, the fund’s unique business model, and the fund’s
distinctive pricing structure. Part II explores when a claim must
be brought derivatively rather than directly, the procedural
consequences of that determination, and the close corporation
exemption to this requirement. Part III examines the facts of the
Northstar decision and argues that while the decision properly
recognized the difference between mutual funds and corporations,
it did not provide a clear framework to handle mutual fund
shareholder suits moving forward. Part IV concludes that given
the major differences between traditional public corporations and
mutual funds, the normal policy reasons in favor of derivative
suits do not apply as strongly to mutual funds. Because of this,
the investors of these funds should be able to circumvent the
derivative action requirement under certain circumstances. This
note proposes using the derivative suit exception for close
corporations that is advocated by the American Law Institute as a
guide for applying this mutual fund exemption. This approach
18 Brief of Amici Curiae Investment Co. Institute & Independent Directors,
supra note 7, at 14–15 (citing 15 U.S.C § 77j(a)(3) (2012)).
19 The majority of all funds are incorporated in these three states. 2014
INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 13, at 225.
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will allow judges to use their discretion and look at each fund’s
characteristics to see if a particular action should be brought
derivatively or directly.
I. MUTUAL FUNDS AND THEIRUNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS
Mutual funds are a huge investment vehicle in the United
States. In 2014, around 90 million individuals invested in mutual
funds in the United States, which comprised 43% of all
households in the country.20 For those households that invested in
mutual funds, “the median amount invested . . . was $103,000.”21
In total, an estimated $15.8 trillion dollars was invested in
mutual funds at the end of 2014.22
Mutual funds are initially organized by a sponsor, who,
when the fund is first launched, is the sole shareholder and
“elects the initial slate of directors.”23 The fund will then
contract with an external investment advisor, who will be in
charge of day-to-day fund management and making the
investments for the fund.24 The sponsor will then file a
prospectus25 and raise money from investors (shareholders),
which will then be invested by the investment advisor of the
fund.26 The interrelation between the sponsor, the investment
advisor, and the directors along with the unique business
model of a mutual fund creates a conflict of interest that does
not exist in traditional public corporations. As is discussed in
Part II, it is especially important that independent board
members be able to vigorously represent the shareholder’s
interests in derivative lawsuits against the fund’s investment
advisor or sponsor because they have the ability to outright
refuse to bring the lawsuit and kill the suit in its infancy.27
20 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK: A REVIEW OF TRENDS AND
ACTIVITIES IN THE U.S. INVESTMENT COMPANY INDUSTRY 114 & fig.6.1 (55th ed. 2015),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2015_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LD3-U6NX] [hereinafter 2015
INVESTMENTCOMPANYFACTBOOK].
21 Id.
22 Id. at 30 fig.2.2.
23 Frequently Asked Questions About Mutual Fund Directors, INV. CO. INST.,
https://www.ici.org/pubs/faqs/ci.faq_fund_gov_idc.idc [https://perma.cc/5DVR-L37G].
24 A. Joseph Warburton, Should Mutual Funds Be Corporations? A Legal &
Econometric Analysis, 33 J. CORP. L. 745, 748 (2008).
25 A prospectus is a document that informs investors of important information
about the fund such as the “fund’s investment objectives or goals, its strategies for achieving
those goals, the principal risks of investing in the fund, the fund’s fees and expenses, and its
past performance.”Mutual Fund Prospectus, supra note 15.
26 Warburton, supra note 24, at 748.
27 See infra Part II.
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A. The Business of a Mutual Fund
Generally, a mutual fund “manages money on behalf of
individuals—or, less commonly, other entities—who buy shares
in the [fund] . . . , which in turn invests the money in other
companies.”28 Investors in a fund can then withdraw their shares
at any time at the fund’s current share price.29 A mutual fund is
different from a typical corporation because its only business is
buying and selling investment instruments, and any increase or
decrease in the price of those instruments “flows directly and
immediately to the shareholders.”30 This is very unique when
compared with a traditional publically held corporation where
the share price is not just the value of its net assets divided by
the number of shares outstanding, but also the product of many
other elements.31 These elements include market sentiment,
growth expectations, valuation, momentum, and central bank
activity.32 By contrast, a mutual fund investor’s shares can be
redeemed at their daily Net Asset Value (NAV), which equals the
“current mark-to-market value of all the fund’s assets, minus
liabilities (e.g., fund expenses), divided by the total number of
outstanding shares.”33 This less dynamic pricing system helps
underpin the structural differences between mutual funds and
traditional publically held corporations.
Another important difference between mutual funds
and typical corporations is that mutual funds normally have no
employees and are externally managed by an investment advisor.34
In practice, that external investment advisor is often also the
sponsor of the fund.35 These external investment advisors are
charged with both managing the funds in a way to get the most
28 MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & JAMES D. COX, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS:
CASES ANDMATERIALS 304 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2014).
29 Id.
30 Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2015).
31 See What Is a Share?, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2001), http://www.theguardian.
com/money/2001/jul/18/shares.investinginshares1 [https://perma.cc/B58H-9P7G].
32 Ben Baden, 5 Factors That Drive Stock Prices, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.:
MONEY (July 14, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/personal-finance/mutual-funds/
articles/2011/07/14/5-factors-that-drive-stock-prices [https://perma.cc/689G-WUDN].
33 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 20, at 257.
34 SeeWarburton, supra note 24, at 748.
35 Victoria E. Schonfeld & Thomas M.J. Kerwin, Organization of a Mutual
Fund, 49 BUS. L. 107, 107–08 (1993); see Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1040–41 (“‘[I]n theory, the
[fund] is able to choose any adviser it deems appropriate to invest the fund’s portfolio,
based on the adviser’s investing style, track record and fees,’ in practice, the investment
adviser picked to manage the portfolio is most often self-selected and unlikely to be
removed.” (quoting John Shipman, Can You Answer This Question: Who Owns Your
Mutual Fund?, WALL ST. J. (May 5, 2003), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1052079698
73142900 [https://perma.cc/6YXS-QRVZ])).
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profit for the fund’s investors and, at the same time, trying to
get the highest profit for their own shareholders, two objectives
which can conflict at times.36 While typically selecting themselves
as the fund’s manager, the sponsors also get to choose which
affiliated individuals they want on the fund’s board of directors
and recruit the “disinterested” directors for the board.37
The Supreme Court has said that because the external
investment advisor usually exclusively manages the fund, “a
mutual fund cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship
with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm’s-length bargaining
do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same manner as
they do in other sectors of the American economy.”38 The
investment advisor is paid a fee by the company, which is
typically a “percentage of [the fund’s] assets under management.”39
The issue with this fee structure is that increasing the assets
under management does not always equate to a better return for
the fund’s shareholders and could be detrimental by actually
decreasing their return.40
All of this amounts to a large number of conflicts of
interest for the advisor and board.41 Assuming the sponsor and
the investment advisor are the same entity, that entity will
have a strong relationship with the board whom they intentionally
recruited. The company’s board of directors is supposed to act as
the representative for the shareholders, but given the strong
ties to the investment advisor, they may not be willing to
advocate for shareholders if it is against the interests of the
investment advisor. As discussed in the next section, even the
disinterested directors may not be as independent as they seem. A
shareholder suit is an effective tool in policing the board and
advisor to ensure that they are effectively managing this conflict;
by forcing shareholder suits to be brought derivatively, a court
could make this method of oversight nearly impossible.
36 Warburton, supra note 24, at 750.
37 Schonfeld & Kerwin, supra note 35, at 107–08.
38 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481 (1979) (quoting S. REP. NO. 91-184,
at 5 (1969)).
39 Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties in
Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor
Sovereignty, 83WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1020 (2005).
40 Joseph Chen et al., Does Fund Size Erode Mutual Fund Performance? The
Role of Liquidity and Organization, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 1276, 1279 (2004).
41 Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1976) (“The
relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is fraught with potential
conflicts of interest.”).
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B. “Disinterested” Directors
The inherent conflict of interest in the mutual fund
space gave rise to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA),
a federal statutory scheme that serves as the primary regulatory
framework applicable to mutual funds.42 One important aspect of
the ICA is the requirement that no more than 60% of the board of
directors of a fund can be “interested persons.”43 As the Supreme
Court has noted, this section of the ICA is “[t]he cornerstone of
[its] effort to control conflicts of interest within mutual funds.”44
An “interested person” as the ICA defines the term, is
generally any person affiliated with the fund, a family member
of an affiliate of the fund, or an affiliate of the investment
advisor of the fund.45 Some argue that this definition is not
strong enough.46 For instance, former employees of the fund’s
sponsor, investment advisor, or its affiliates are still considered
independent once they leave the company under the ICA
definition.47 Despite the ICA only requiring 40% of a board be
independent, in practice, most mutual fund boards have higher
than 40% independence.48 As of 2012, 85% of fund complexes
had more than 75% independence on their boards.49 The makeup of
the independent portion of a board of directors is very important
because the ICA has given independent board members special
duties in an effort to enable them to represent the interests of
the shareholders and help police conflicts of interests for the
investment advisor.50 For example, they must vote separately
on certain issues such as contracts with the investment advisor.51
Despite the “watchdog” role52 that independent directors
are supposed to play for the investors in mutual funds, many
scholars have questioned their true independence from the sponsor
42 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80b-21 (2012); Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1020
(citing JOELSELIGMAN, THETRANSFORMATIONOFWALLSTREET 222–29 (rev. ed. 2003)).
43 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a).
44 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 482 (1979).
45 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-2(19).
46 See, e.g., Eric D. Roiter, Disentangling Mutual Fund Governance from
Corporate Governance, 6 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 23–24 (2016); Shipman, supra note 35 (“The
definition of ‘independent’ is fairly loose when it comes to fund board members . . . .”).
47 Shipman, supra note 35 (“So, for example, Joseph S. DiMartino, who was
president of Dreyfus Corp. for a dozen years before becoming chairman of the fund boards
for the Dreyfus fund group, is considered an independent director.”).
48 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 20, at 259.
49 Id.
50 Shipman, supra note 35.
51 5 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2012).
52 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979).
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and investment advisor.53 As Warren Buffet has put it, “[a]
monkey will type out a Shakespeare play before an ‘independent’
mutual-fund director will suggest his fund look at other
managers, even if the incumbent manager has persistently
delivered substandard performance.”54 In fact, in any given year
between 1993 and 2002, only about 10% of all mutual funds
renegotiated their management fees—the fees paid by the fund to
the investment advisor for advisory services.55
There are other issues regarding the true independence
of the board of directors in mutual funds. Generally, a mutual
fund’s directors lack proficiency in managing a portfolio of
stocks, which is something the investment advisor has in
abundance.56 Compounding that issue is the fact that boards must
rely on the investment advisor to furnish them with information
about the fund’s operations and performance because the
directors themselves do not have their own full-time staff.57 With
this lack of expertise and knowledge, the board may not be able
to effectively negotiate with the external investment advisor on
behalf of the mutual fund and its investors.
Further, independent directors of funds that are within
large fund complexes—meaning that the investment advisor
manages a large number of additional funds—often serve on
the board of many, if not all, of the complex’s managed funds.58
Compared to directors of traditional publicly traded corporations
“who might sit on two or three boards (and at most six or seven
boards), it is not unusual for fund directors to sit on the boards
of twenty, fifty, or even more than one hundred funds.”59 While
sitting on such a large number of boards with the same
investment advisor means a large amount of compensation, those
board members are technically not employees of the investment
advisors and can maintain their disinterested title under the
ICA.60 Despite this uncertainty of how truly independent these
disinterested directors are, they play a crucial role in the context
of derivative shareholder litigation.61
53 See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY: A
BETTER WAY TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 21–22 (2007); Warburton, supra note 24, at
751–55; see also Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1061 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“They are essentially puppets of the investment adviser.”).
54 Shipman, supra note 35.
55 Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance, and
Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2185, 2186 (2009).
56 Warburton, supra note 24, at 751.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 751–52.
59 Roiter, supra note 46, at 23–24 (footnote omitted).
60 See, e.g., Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., L.P., 380 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2004).
61 See infra Section II.B.
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C. Leverage
Another important aspect of the ICA is the limitation on
the amount of debt mutual funds can have, often referred to as
“leverage.” A corporation traded on a public exchange is free to
take out as much debt as it is able to raise and as management
feels is financially prudent. As of February 2016, the average
debt-to-equity ratio—the measurement of the amount of debt a
company uses to finance their assets—of the S&P 500 was
1.1.62 By contrast, the ICA says that a mutual fund can only
borrow funds from a bank, “[p]rovided, [t]hat immediately after
any such borrowing there is an asset coverage of at least 300
per centum for all borrowings of such registered company.”63
Asset coverage is defined in the statute as “the ratio which the
value of the total assets of [the fund], less all liabilities and
indebtedness not represented by senior securities [including
loans], bears to the aggregate amount of [loans] . . . representing
indebtedness of such [fund].”64 This means that for every $1 of
loans that the mutual fund takes out, it should have at least $3
of assets less nondebt obligations. Despite this limitation, many
funds go further in limiting the amount they can borrow.65
Often, funds will “adopt a policy stating that they will borrow
only as a temporary measure for extraordinary or emergency
purposes and not to finance investment in securities.”66 These
restrictions, either by the ICA or by the policies of the mutual
funds themselves, mean that there are often few, if any, creditors
of funds, creating a very simple capital structure within the fund.
This is crucial when evaluating whether a suit should be brought
derivatively or directly because a judge will not have to worry
about protecting creditors in recovery of a direct action.
D. Investor Makeup and Lack of Institutional Voice
Another important distinction between mutual funds
and typical publicly held corporations is their investor makeup.
A majority of shareholders in mutual funds are individual
investors.67 In 2014, institutions made up only 11% of the
62 Nir Kaissar, The Great Corporate Debt Scare, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/gadfly/articles/2016-02-08/about-that-29-trillion-in-corporate-
debt [https://perma.cc/9UBP-A2UQ].
63 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f)(1) (2012).
64 Id. § 80a-18(h).
65 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 20, at 262.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 29.
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shareholders of mutual funds.68 By contrast, institutional
investors owned approximately 51% of the common stock of public
companies, and “73 percent of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S.
corporations as of 2009.”69 The rise of the institutional investor
in the past thirty years has been credited with an increase in
shareholder activism in publicly held corporations.70 This increase
in activism is a result of institutional shareholders being more
sophisticated than a typical individual shareholder and incurring
a lower cost of activism.71 Additionally, institutional shareholders
are better able to justify activism than retail investors because
“[a]s a shareholding gets larger, the ratio between (i) the cost of
investing time and effort in activism and (ii) the potential
benefit—that is, increasing the value of portfolio corporations—
becomes smaller.”72
In its most basic form, activism is being diligent in voting
on all management and shareholder proposals, meaning
“considering such proposals on their merits, rather than
automatically voting with management.”73 While activist
shareholders generally do not nominate their own directors for
fear of insider trading, they may choose to vote to reject
incumbent directors or withhold votes in their elections.74
Withholding votes can be a powerful tool because it sends a clear
message of dissatisfaction to management and helps “induc[e]
governance changes.75
With a lack of institutional shareholders, mutual funds do
not benefit from the de facto corporate governance from increased
shareholder activism that comes with their presence. Individual
retail shareholders are less likely to detect misbehavior because
they may not possess the requisite level of sophistication to detect
it.76 The lack of policing by retail shareholders is evident in the
lack of engagement in retail shareholder votes.77 When investors
in a company are majority retail investors, shares are more
68 Id.
69 EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 306.
70 Id. at 301 (“This shift from relatively complete shareholder passivity to varying
degrees of shareholder activism was precipitated by a dramatic increase in the percentage of
stock held by institutional, as opposed to individual shareholders . . . .”).
71 Id. (“[A]s the level of a shareholder’s sophistication increases, the cost of
activism decreases.”).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 301–02 (quoting Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, The Insignificance of
Proxy Access 12–13, 26 (New York University Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 240, 2010)).
75 Id.
76 David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VILL. J.L.
& INV. MGMT. 6, 11 (2001–2002).
77 Id. at 26 (“[M]utual fund shareholders, in general, participate in the voting
process less often than shareholders of traditional corporations.”).
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dispersed and it is hard to get enough votes to accept or reject a
proposal.78 In regard to board members, while the ICA requires
all directors be elected by shareholders in the funds,79 in practice,
mutual fund shareholders almost never reject candidates for the
board of directors brought to them by the fund’s investment
advisor.80 Additionally, if there is a vacancy on the board, the
independent directors—who were selected by the investment
advisor—nominate a candidate to fill the void, and shareholders
almost always affirm that nomination. As discussed above in
Section I.B, the independent directors who choose the new board
member are often heavily affiliated with the investment advisor,
perpetuating the lack of true independence on the board.81
II. DERIVATIVE VERSUSDIRECT ACTION
A shareholder derivative suit is a common law concept
that allows a shareholder of a corporation to compel that
organization to bring suit for harm done to the corporation.82 In
its most basic form, the principle difference between a derivative
and direct action is that a derivative action “is brought on the
corporation’s behalf” while a direct action “is brought on a
shareholder’s own behalf.”83
A. Tooley Test and Rationale
In Tooley v. Donaldson, the Delaware Supreme Court
established the basic framework for deciding whether a
78 Id. at 26–27.
79 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (2012) (“No person shall serve as a director of a registered
investment company unless elected to that office by the holders of the outstanding voting
securities of such company, at an annual or a special meeting duly called for that purpose;
except that vacancies occurring between such meetings may be filled in any otherwise legal
manner if immediately after filling any such vacancy at least two-thirds of the directors
then holding office shall have been elected to such office by the holders of the outstanding
voting securities of the company at such an annual or special meeting.”).
80 Carter, supra note 76, at 25.
81 Richard M. Phillips, Deregulation Under the Investment Company Act—A
Reevaluation of the Corporate Paraphernalia of Shareholder Voting and Boards of
Directors, 37 BUS. LAW. 903, 909–10 (1982) (“The shareholder vote is nothing more than a
ritualistic ratification of nominees selected either by the external manager or the incumbent
independent directors.”); Warburton, supra note 24, at 757 (“In the history of the
Investment Company Act, critics observe that there have been virtually no shareholder
attempts to elect nominees to the board in opposition to management nominees, or to
ouster an incumbent director through a proxy fight.”).
82 Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) (“The common
law countries have devised one of the most interesting and ingenious of accountability
mechanisms for large formal organizations: the shareholder’s derivative suit.” (quoting
ROBERTCHARLESCLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639 (1986))).
83 EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 1029.
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shareholder should bring a suit directly or derivatively.84 The
Tooley court held that the two questions to ask when deciding
how a suit may be brought are: “(1) who suffered the alleged harm
(the corporation or the suing stockholders, individually); and (2)
who would receive the benefit of any recovery or other remedy
(the corporation or the stockholders, individually)?”85 However, in
its decision, the Delaware court recognized that in practice there
exists considerable difficulty in giving a definitive answer to
either of those questions.86 Still, the court urged for them to be
used as a general guideline in helping decide if a case should be
brought derivatively or directly.87
Many policy reasons urge for the distinction between
direct and derivative actions. The general idea behind the need
for a derivative suit is that “a corporation is a legal person
separate from its shareholders.”88 If a director or officer
mismanages the corporation in a way that decreases its share
price, that wrong is against the corporation and the corporation
is entitled to bring forth the suit.89 However, the proposition that
any wrong to the corporation is not a wrong to the shareholder is
questionable because any harm to the corporation must harm
that corporation’s shareholders as well.90 This is especially true
in the context of how a mutual fund’s shares are valued, where
any harm will automatically flow to the shareholders.91
Derivative suits are also important in that they protect
creditors in the case of a recovery.92 The idea is that not only
shareholders but also creditors can be injured by wrongful acts
to the corporation.93 If a suit is brought derivatively, then the
proceeds from that suit go directly to the corporation and the
creditors benefit as well as the shareholders.94 If the suit is
brought directly, then the proceeds go to the shareholder who
84 Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035–36
(Del. 2004).
85 Id. at 1033.
86 Id. at 1036; see also Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1212 (Del. 1996) (“Courts
have long recognized that the same set of facts can give rise both to a direct claim and a
derivative claim.”).
87 Tooley, 845 A.2d at 1036.
88 EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 1029.
89 Smith v. Bramwell, 31 P.2d 647, 648 (Or. 1934).
90 EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 1030.
91 See 2015 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 20, at 257.
92 George Wasserman & Janice Wasserman Goldsten Family LLC v. Kay, 14
A.3d 1193, 1207 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); Peterson v. Kennedy, 791 S.W.2d 459, 464
(Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld, 648 S.E.2d 399, 403–04 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007);
EISENBERG & COX, supra note 28, at 1030 (citing Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235, 237
(9th Cir. 1956)).
93 Peterson, 791 S.W.2d at 464 (citing Schick v. Riemer, 263 S.W.2d 51, 54
(Mo. Ct. App. 1953)).
94 Id.
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brought suit, excluding the corporate creditor from any benefit.95
In addition to the protection of corporate creditors, much of the
support for derivative suits derives from their ability to prevent
a multiplicity of lawsuits from individual shareholders; because
the corporation must bring the suit, there will only be one.96
Further derivative suits protect the interests of all shareholders,
even those not party to a suit because the damages awarded go to
the corporation, which in turn benefits all of its shareholders.97
B. The Demand Requirement and Other Procedural Hurdles
Another common reason cited for the need to bring suits
derivatively is that such suits enable the board of directors to
dictate the corporation’s actions through the demand requirement.
The demand requirement means that a shareholder must first
make a formal demand upon the board of directors before
bringing a derivative suit against a corporation.98 All jurisdictions
have such a requirement.99 This demand is essentially the
shareholder telling the board that they should compel the
corporation to bring the suit itself.100 In the context of a mutual
fund, these suits are often in regard to fee disputes—where
shareholders feel that the investment advisor got more than they
should have—or for deviation from the prospectus—where the
investment advisor invests in stock that is contrary to what the
shareholders were promised they would invest in.101
The “‘demand requirement’ affords the directors an
opportunity to exercise their reasonable business judgment and
‘waive a legal right vested in the corporation in the belief that
its best interests will be promoted by not insisting on such
right.’”102 In evaluating the demand, the board must decide if it
wants to invest the corporation’s time and resources in pursuing
95 Id.
96 Wasserman, 14 A.3d at 1207.
97 See id.
98 Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law Versus the
American Law Institute, 48 BUS. LAW. 1443, 1451 (1993).
99 Id.
100 See id.
101 See, e.g., Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1036
(9th Cir. 2015); In re Salomon Smith Barney Mut. Fund Fees Litig., 528 F. Supp. 2d
332, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
102 Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 532–33 (1984) (quoting Corbus
v. Alaska Treadwell Gold Mining Co., 187 U.S. 455, 463 (1903)); see RCM Sec. Fund, Inc.
v. Stanton, 928 F.2d 1318, 1326 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Whether a corporation should bring a
lawsuit is a business decision, and the directors are, under the laws of every state,
responsible for the conduct of the corporation’s business, including the decision to
litigate.” (internal citations omitted)).
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a claim.103 This additional investigation “enables corporate
management to pursue alternative remedies,”104 which in turn
“serves the interests of judicial economy.”105 Further reasons for
the demand requirement are to allow the courts to avoid making
decisions of internal corporate governance and to allow boards to
prevent suits that harass the company or suits that are considered
“strike suits,” meaning they are brought for the benefit of the
individual shareholder instead of the corporation.106
When demand is given to the board of directors, it is
normally reviewed by independent directors who have no
interest in the underlying conduct of the claim.107 In the case of
a suit against an investment advisor of a mutual fund, this
would likely be the “disinterested” board members as defined in
the ICA.108 If the independent directors accept the demand, that
will end the shareholder’s control of the litigation.109 If the
independent directors reject a demand brought by a shareholder
of the corporation, the court will scrutinize any challenge to that
decision under the “‘business judgment rule’ standard of
review.”110 This approach is the law in every jurisdiction that has
addressed this issue.111 The business judgment rule is an extremely
deferential standard; the court will only overturn the decisions of
the board of directors if the shareholder proves more than mere
negligence by the board in its decision.112 In other words, the
shareholder must show “gross negligence, bad-faith, or
recklessness.”113 Given this difficult standard to overcome, “[m]any
shareholders opt not to make a demand on the board of directors
because the board often decides that the litigation is not in the
best interests of the corporation and . . . a court is unlikely to alter
the board’s decision and disturb its business judgment.”114
Delaware, Massachusetts, and Maryland each have
differing standards for when demand is required. Under
Delaware law, if a shareholder does not make a demand on the
103 Starrels v. First Nat’l Bank of Chi., 870 F.2d 1168, 1173 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., concurring).
104 Cramer v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978).
105 Barr v. Wackman, 329 N.E.2d 180, 186 (N.Y. 1975).
106 Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1037 (N.Y. 1996).
107 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 7.04 (AM. LAW INST. 1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE].
108 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1979).
109 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 101 (1991).
110 Id.
111 Block et al., supra note 98, at 1457–58.
112 Kurt A. Goehre, Is the Demand Requirement Obsolete? How the United
KingdomModernized Its Shareholder Derivative Procedure and What the United States Can
Learn from It, 28WIS. INT’LL.J. 140, 145–46 (2010–2011).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 146.
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board and still wants to bring a derivative suit, he will have to
allege with particularity why demand would have been futile.115
To succeed on a claim of futility of demand in Delaware, the
plaintiff must plead that particularized facts create a reasonable
doubt that “the directors are disinterested and independent” or
“the challenged transaction was otherwise the product of a valid
exercise of business judgment.”116 By contrast, Massachusetts,117
along with nineteen other states,118 has statutorily adopted the
universal demand requirement for derivative actions as
advocated by the American Law Institute.119 This rule states
that demand must be made in all derivative suits and a plaintiff
cannot file suit until ninety days elapses from the date of
demand.120 The only exception to this rule is if the plaintiff is
able to show that the corporation will suffer irreparable injury if
it is forced to wait the ninety days.121
Finally, Maryland falls somewhere in between
Massachusetts and Delaware, allowing excuse for demand in the
event of futility in only a narrow number of circumstances.122
Courts in Maryland will find a futility exception to demand only
if the complaint particularly demonstrates that either:
(1) a demand, or a delay in awaiting a response to a demand, would
cause irreparable harm to the corporation, or (2) a majority of the
directors are so personally and directly conflicted or committed to the
decision in dispute that they cannot reasonably be expected to respond
to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the business
judgment rule.123
Given the lack of judicial scrutiny applied to board
decisions to reject demand and the difficulty of proving demand
futility (if it is allowed at all), the demand requirement proves
to be an almost insurmountable procedural hurdle to bringing
a derivative action in the context of mutual funds. Due to a
mutual fund’s board’s strong ties to the investment advisor,124
115 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a).
116 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253 (Del. 2000) (citing Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).
117 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 7.42 (West 2004).
118 Goehre, supra note 112, at 147 n.52 (citing Seth Aronson et al., Shareholder
Derivative Actions: From Cradle to Grave, in CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SER.:
SEC. LITIG. & ENFORCEMENT INST. 261, 289–92 (Practicing L. Inst. Sept.–Oct. 2008)); see
MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 156D, § 7.42.
119 Marx v. Akers, 666 N.E.2d 1034, 1038 (N.Y. 1996); PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATEGOVERNANCE, supra note 107, § 7.03.
120 Marx, 666 N.E.2d at 1038.
121 Id.
122 SeeWerbowsky v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123, 144 (Md. 2001).
123 Id.
124 See supra Section I.A.
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they would likely reject the shareholder’s demand and refuse to
initiate a suit on behalf of the company. A shareholder could try
to plead futility if the shareholder were in Delaware or Maryland,
but it is highly unlikely that she can prove futility because the
test in those states for challenging independence of boards is
stronger than the criteria for independence required by the
ICA.125 Based on all these hurdles, a shareholder would likely
prefer to bring the claim directly rather than derivatively.
C. Exception for Closely Held Corporations
The American Law Institute has proposed a separate rule
for deciding when a shareholder suit must be brought directly or
derivatively in the context of closely held corporations.126 Section
7.01(d) of the Principles of Corporate Governance says:
In the case of a closely held corporation . . . , the court in its
discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims as a direct
action, exempt it from those restrictions and defenses applicable only
to derivative actions, and order an individual recovery, if it finds
that to do so will not (i) unfairly expose the corporation or the
defendants to a multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the
interests of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere with a fair
distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.127
In this section, the ALI recognizes the reality that for
certain suits the typical policy reasons outlined above are not
present or are less substantial.128 In the case of closely held
corporations, the ALI suggests doing a case-by-case analysis to
see if the normal policy considerations—mainly the three
enumerated in Section 7.01(d)—that urge a suit to be brought
derivatively apply to a particular case.129 In addition, the
comments to Section 7.01 say that the court should consider
whether the corporation has a disinterested board that could
evaluate the suit in making this determination.130 The reasoning
behind this rule is that in a closely held corporation, these
125 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(19) (2012).
126 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note, 107, § 7.01(d). The ALI
defines a closely held corporation as “a corporation the equity securities . . . of which are
owned by a small number of persons, and for which securities no active trading market
exists.” Id. § 1.06.
127 Id. § 7.01(d).
128 Id. § 7.01 cmt. e (“In some circumstances, the normal policy reasons for
requiring a plaintiff to employ the form of the derivative action may not be present or will
be less weighty, even though the action alleges in substance a corporate injury.”).
129 Id.
130 Id.; see also Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E.2d 559, 562 (Ind. 1995) (“[T]he court in
making its decision should consider whether the corporation has a disinterested board
that should be permitted to consider the lawsuit’s impact on the corporation.”).
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enumerated policy reasons for requiring suits to be brought
derivatively usually do not exist.131 As explained in Part IV,
this same rationale can be applied to mutual funds in allowing
exceptions to the derivative requirement. While Delaware has
not adopted this exception,132 more states are looking at closely
held corporations differently and applying a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether or not to allow shareholders to
bring a direct suit instead of a derivative suit.133
III. NORTHSTAR FINANCIAL ADVISORS V. SCHWAB
INVESTMENTS: FINDING AN EXCEPTION TO THE
DERIVATIVE RULE
In Northstar Financial Advisors v. Schwab Investments,
the Ninth Circuit found that a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against a mutual fund’s investment advisor that would normally
need to be brought derivatively could be brought directly instead.134
Organized under Massachusetts law, Schwab Investments was an
investment trust that sponsored a series of mutual funds,
including Schwab Total Bond Market Fund.135 The trust selected
Charles Schwab Investment Management, Inc. as its outside
investment advisor for all funds.136 Charles Schwab Investment
Management, Inc. and Schwab Investments were essentially the
same entity and held themselves out as such to investors.137
Schwab Total Market Fund issued prospectuses to
potential investors stating that the fund’s fundamental investment
strategy was to track “‘the performance of the Lehman Brothers
[U.S.] Aggregate Bond Index’ . . . and was ‘intended for investors
seeking to fill the fixed income component of their asset allocation
plan.’”138 Because this was a fundamental investment strategy, it
could only be changed with approval by the majority of
shareholders.139 Further, “[t]he [f]und was also precluded from
investing twenty-five percent or more of the [f]und’s total assets in
any one industry.”140 The fund subsequently deviated from these
two stipulations in the fund prospectus without shareholder vote
131 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE, supra note 107, § 7.01 cmt. e.
132 Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379, 384 (7th Cir. 1990)
(noting that Delaware has not accepted this close corporation exception).
133 See Barth, 659 N.E.2d at 562.
134 Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1056–62
(9th Cir. 2015).
135 Id. at 1039.
136 Id. at 1041.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1042.
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and the investors brought a direct class action against the
investment advisor.141
The investors brought a breach of fiduciary duty claim
against Schwab directly and the court went through a lengthy
analysis in finding that the claim could proceed and did not
need to be brought derivatively.142 The court first looked at the
declaration of trust of the fund and found that it did not preclude
direct suit.143 Next, the court found that because the mutual fund
was set up as a trust, that the trustee (the investment advisor)
had a fiduciary responsibility to the beneficiaries of the trust (the
shareholders).144 The court then applied a test from a prior Ninth
Circuit case, applying Massachusetts law that found that plaintiffs
can bring a direct suit if the wrong involved the shareholders’
“contractual rights, such as the right to vote.”145 The Ninth Circuit
held that the registration statements and prospectuses which
contained both the investment objective and the industry
maximum percentage were both offers by the investment advisor
to sell shares in the fund.146 By purchasing the shares, investors
were accepting that offer, creating a binding contract.147 The court
found that deviating from these agreed upon investment strategies
constituted a breach of contract by Schwab.148 Because the court
found that Schwab breached its contract, the court was able to fit
the suit into the exception and allowed the shareholders to bring
it directly.149
The court could have ended its inquiry there and found
that the claim could be brought directly because there was a breach
of contract; the court then went on, however, to make sweeping
statements that highlighted the features of mutual funds that
may be reason to allow direct suits. The Ninth Circuit noted that
while traditional corporations engage in a business, a mutual
fund has “no business other than acquiring investment
instruments . . . . [a]ny decrease in a mutual fund’s share price
flows directly and immediately to the shareholders.”150 This means
that a mutual fund is merely a conduit for their shareholders to
invest in a variety of investment instruments and the shares in
mutual funds are simply a product of the value of those investment
141 Id. at 1039.
142 Id. at 1056–62.
143 Id. at 1057.
144 Id.
145 Id. (citing Lapidus v. Hecht, 232 F.3d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 2000)).
146 Id. at 1054.
147 Id.
148 Id. 1054–55.
149 Id. at 1057–58.
150 Id. at 1058.
1444 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:3
instruments. Moreover, the court called into question the true
independence of disinterested board members in evaluating a
potential demand in a derivative suit, calling them “puppets of
the investment adviser.”151 The court pointed to the very loose
definition of independence within the ICA, noting that it allows
even former employees of the investment advisor to be independent
board members.152 Because independent board members are tasked
with evaluating derivative demands for suits against the
investment advisor, the court was concerned the independent
directors would remain loyal to the investment advisor instead
of shareholders.153
While the court admonished derivative suits in the
context of mutual funds, the court’s finding of a contractual
breach was central to its holding that the claim could proceed
directly. One issue with the decision is that it did not clearly
indicate whether its reasoning applies only to mutual funds set
up as Massachusetts Trusts,154 or whether it also applies to
funds set up as Delaware trusts or Maryland corporations.155
The court likely looked at the structure of mutual funds
and their boards and thought a plaintiff should not have to go
through the procedural hurdles of bringing a derivative suit
because the independent board members lacked true
independence. But, because there is no case law that finds a
mutual fund exception to the derivative suit requirement, the
court was forced to squeeze the case into the existing
Massachusetts common law concept of a contractual exception to
the derivate action requirement.156 While this is perhaps one
way of dealing with derivative suits in the mutual fund context, it
arguably cannot be applied to future cases that do not involve a
mutual fund in violation of its fundamental investment objectives
151 Id. at 1061 (The court also noted that definition of independent directors in
the ICA is “fairly loose.”).
152 Id.
153 Id. at 1061–62.
154 A Massachusetts Trust “is an unincorporated business organization created
by an instrument of trust by which property is to be held and managed by trustees for the
benefit of persons who are or become the holders of the beneficial interests in the trust
estate.” Id. at 1039. It is primarily used as a means to escape certain liability that a
normal corporation may be subject to. Id. at 1039 n.1 (quoting JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL.,
WILLS, TRUSTS, ANDESTATES 555–56 (8th ed. 2009)).
155 A majority of mutual funds are set up under Massachusetts, Delaware, or
Maryland law. 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 13, at 225. Under
Massachusetts and Delaware law, mutual funds are typically set up as trusts, while
under Maryland law the funds are set up as corporations. Id. at 225 fig.A.1.
156 In the opinion, there are no citations to any case law in the discussion of
mutual fund structures, but there was a previous Ninth Circuit opinion applying
Massachusetts law that found a breach of contract exception to the derivative suit
requirement. See Northstar, 779 F.3d at 1056–62.
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as laid out in the fund prospectus of a fund complex set up as a
Massachusetts Trust. For example, if shareholders felt that the
investment advisor breached a fiduciary duty owed to the fund,
those shareholders would not be able to rely on Northstar’s holding
to avoid demand on the board, because there was no breach of the
terms of the prospectus.
IV. A MUTUAL FUND EXCEPTION TO THEDERIVATIVE SUIT
REQUIREMENT
A. How Other Courts Handle Mutual Fund Suits
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the important differences
between a mutual fund and normal corporations in Northstar.157
This decision, however, is an outlier. More often courts will treat a
mutual fund shareholder suit no differently than a shareholder
suit against a traditional corporation. An example of this refusal
to recognize the inherent differences in the two corporate forms
can be found in Scalisi v. Fund Asset Management, where the
plaintiff brought a derivative suit without making a demand on
the board and claimed futility because the fund directors served
on forty-nine additional mutual fund boards under the same
sponsor, collecting between $160,000 and $260,000 in fees.158 The
court would not consider the uniqueness of mutual fund complexes
and held that it must apply the very limited demand futility
exception that Maryland courts apply to every corporation.159 By
refusing to consider the realities of the mutual fund industry, the
court killed the plaintiffs’ suit by forcing them to make a demand
on the mutual fund’s very interested independent board members.
This application of traditional corporate law to mutual
funds also applies when a court is grappling with the derivative
versus direct distinction.160 In In re Evergreen Mutual Funds Fee
Litigation, investors in a mutual fund brought a direct suit for
breach of fiduciary duty against an investment advisor for
engaging in a kickback scheme where the investment advisor
157 Id. at 1058–61.
158 See Scalisi v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 380 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 2004).
159 Id. at 138–42 (The court defined the futility exception as “a very limited
exception, to be applied only when the allegations or evidence clearly demonstrate, in a very
particular manner, either that (1) a demand, or a delay in awaiting a response to a demand,
would cause irreparable harm to the corporation, or (2) a majority of the directors are so
personally and directly conflicted or committed to the decision in dispute that they cannot
reasonably be expected to respond to a demand in good faith and within the ambit of the
business judgment rule.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Werbowski v. Collomb, 766 A.2d 123,
144 (Md. 2001))).
160 In re Evergreen Mut. Funds Fee Litig., 423 F. Supp. 2d 249, 260
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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paid brokerage houses to push their funds to clients.161 The
plaintiff-shareholders attempted to argue the harm was borne
directly to them independent of the harm to the fund.162 The
district court, applying Delaware law, rejected this argument and
found that the traditional Tooley rule that is applied to all
corporations needed to be applied to the mutual fund to determine
if the claim could be brought directly or had to be brought
derivatively.163 In applying the Tooley test, the court concluded the
harm was to the corporation,164 and must be brought
derivatively.165 While this case is only binding in the Southern
District of New York, this holding dictates that shareholders now
have to make a demand to the mutual fund’s “disinterested”
board members and hope they ignore their strong ties to the
investment advisor. This is an unfortunate result because the
plaintiff was unable to get a remedy for the wrongful acts of the
fund’s investment advisor due to the court’s unwillingness to
recognize the unique characteristics of mutual funds.
The courts in Delaware, Massachusetts, and Maryland
need to reevaluate treating mutual funds the same as traditional
corporations. Under the current model, courts wishing to recognize
the differences between the two types of entities are forced to do
what theNorthstar court did and squeeze mutual fund shareholder
suits into various pre-established exceptions to the derivative suit
requirement to allow them to be brought directly. Instead, states
should allow courts to analyze case-by-case whether the standard
policy reasons for needing to bring a suit derivatively apply as a
test to decide if the suit can be brought directly.
B. A New Way to Consider Direct Suits
Similar to closely held corporations, the inherent
characteristics of mutual funds require a separate test to
determine if a suit can be brought directly. Unlike shareholders of
traditional corporations with large powerful institutional investor
bases,166 shareholders of mutual funds must have a way to exert
their own corporate governance control over the funds. As is the
norm now, investment advisors do not have to worry about investor
activism due to the lack of institutional shareholders.167 Further,
161 Id. at 254.
162 Id. at 261.
163 Id. at 260–61.
164 Even though the fund was set up as a trust. Id. at 253.
165 Id. at 260–61.
166 EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 306.
167 Compare id. at 301.
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because a mutual fund’s investment advisor typically collects fees
as a percentage of total assets,168 and increasing total assets does
not lead to enhanced performance of a fund,169 the investment
adviser’s interests are not always fully aligned with investors’
interests. The investment advisor has more leeway to do what it
pleases in the management of funds. It can issue proposals
requiring shareholder approval, even if those proposals are not in
the best interest of the shareholders, and know that the
shareholders are likely to vote with management regardless.170
Even if a shareholder realizes the wrongdoing of an
investment advisor, the shareholder will likely be forced to
make a demand on the board if she wants to bring a suit for
breach of fiduciary duty,171 unless she can plead futility,172 which
is already a very steep hill to climb173 and is unavailable in
Massachusetts.174 By forcing demand, “disinterested” members
of the board will have an opportunity to evaluate the claim and
choose whether to accept or reject it, with the court only reviewing
that decision on a business judgment standard of review.175 Of
course, the people evaluating the claim are “independent” board
members, who for the most part are deeply affiliated with the
investment advisor.176 Thus, the board is likely to reject any
demand made upon it to bring suit derivatively, effectively killing
the rightful claim of breach of fiduciary duty. This hypothetical
situation highlights the types of problems that arise when courts
force mutual fund investors to make their claims derivatively.
Similar to closely held corporations, shareholder litigation
in the context of mutual funds “will often not implicate the
principles which gave rise to the rule requiring derivative
litigation.”177 The idea that a mutual fund “is a legal person
separate from its shareholders”178 is more dubious in the context
of mutual funds then in the context of a normal corporation.
Mutual funds have no employees179 and primarily are just
vehicles for shareholders to invest in a diversified portfolio of
investments with all increases and decreases of those investments
168 Langevoort, supra note 39, at 1020.
169 Chen et al., supra note 40, at 1279.
170 See EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 301–02.
171 Block et al., supra note 98, at 1451.
172 DEL. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. P. 23.1(a).
173 See supra Section II.B.
174 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156D, § 7.42 (West 2004).
175 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE, supra note 107, § 7.04.
176 See supra Section II.B.
177 Barth v. Barth, 659 N.E. 2d 559, 562 (Ind. 1995).
178 EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 1029.
179 Warburton, supra note 24, at 748.
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going directly to the shareholder, not the corporation.180
Everything the fund’s investment advisor does in relation to the
fund will automatically flow directly to the shareholders, because
no complicated variables affect share price.181 Further, funds often
have no creditors who would get left out of recovery because the
ICA limits leverage in funds, and mutual funds normally self-
regulate this in their own policies by explicitly prohibiting any
debt.182 Additionally, class actions can help avoid the likelihood of
multiplicity of suits and protect the interests of all shareholders.183
As stated in the comments of the ALI’s Principles of Corporate
Governance, “[i]n general, when a direct action is brought on
behalf of the entire class of injured shareholders and the
corporation’s solvency is not in question, there is less reason to
insist that the action be brought derivatively.”184
Recognizing that it would be unfair to assume that
every mutual fund shareholder suit follows the pattern laid out
in the above hypothetical, judges should use a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether to require a normally derivative
suit to be brought directly. This test is substantially the same
test that the ALI advocates for closely held corporations in the
same context.185 The court in its discretion should allow a direct
suit in the context of mutual funds so long as the suit does not “(i)
unfairly expose the [mutual fund] or the defendants to a
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the interests of
creditors of the [mutual fund], or (iii) interfere with a fair
distribution of the recovery among all interested persons.”186
Further, as the comments in the Principles of Corporate
Governance advocate, in evaluating the fair distribution prong of
this test, a plaintiff should be required to give reasonable notice to
interested persons of the impending class action suit.187
There should not be a per se exception to the derivative
litigation requirement for mutual funds. The primary policy
reasons—namely the three prongs above—for requiring a
derivative suit may be present in specific mutual fund shareholder
litigation, and thus, the claim should not be exempt. In addition to
180 See EISENBERG&COX, supra note 28, at 304.
181 2014 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK, supra note 13, at 225.
182 Id. at 262.
183 Northstar Fin. Advisors v. Schwab Invs., 779 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 2015)
(These concerns are “ameliorated by the very nature of class action, which is designed to
avoid a multiplicity of suits by shareholders and which contain procedural mechanisms to
ensure that all members of the class are treated equally.”).
184 PRINCIPLESOFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE, supra note 107, § 7.01 cmt. e, at 22.
185 Id. § 7.01(d).
186 Id.
187 Id. § 7.01 cmt. e.
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considering the three prongs, the judge should still have the
discretion to decide whether to allow a suit directly. Judges
should evaluate factors such as the true independence of the
fund’s board, the fund’s investor makeup (retail versus
institutional) and the degree of the fund’s leverage in determining
whether to allow a claim to be brought directly in any specific
shareholder suit. The judge should ensure that the recovery of a
direct suit will be equitable for all shareholders of the fund and
that the fund will not be open to a multiplicity of suits if it
invokes the exception. The judge must use his or her discretion,
after evaluating everything, in allowing a direct suit.
Opponents of this proposal may argue—as the ICI
argued in their amici curiae brief in Northstar—that by allowing
direct suits, courts will undermine the important role that
independent board members are supposed to play in corporate
governance.188 While this argument perhaps makes sense in the
context of public corporations where the independence of a board
can be more trusted, independent mutual fund directors should
not be afforded the right to terminate shareholder suits. Their
independence simply cannot always be trusted given that it is
permissive for them to have strong ties to investment advisors
and still qualify as independent under the ICA.189
CONCLUSION
Courts must be afforded flexibility to prevent
“disinterested” directors from rejecting meritorious lawsuits.
Mutual fund shareholders must have a way of exerting their own
corporate governance on mutual fund investment advisors. The
way the direct and derivative suit dichotomy is governed cannot
be applied the same way to mutual funds as it is to traditional
corporations. Allowing a case-by-case analysis will force investment
advisors of mutual funds to be more careful in their affairs, as they
will know they cannot hide behind the procedural hurdles of
derivative suits. States adopting this new rule will be protecting
the large number of citizens who invest their hard-earned money
into mutual funds.
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